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INTRODUCTION
Despite their status as the largest minority group in the United States,
Hispanics remain dramatically underrepresented in elected office. The U.S.
Census estimates that over 41.3 million Latinos live in the United States,'
making up 14% of the nation's population.' Nevertheless, of the 535 members
of Congress, only 28 (5%) are Hispanic. 3 This pattern of underrepresentation
extends to the state level.4 In California and Texas-the two states with the
largest Latino populations'- Hispanics amount to approximately one-third of
the state population, but hold only 5.2% and 7.3% of state offices, respectively.6
This level of representation marks a high point for the Latino community;
until the early 198os, Hispanic representation in Congress lingered in the
single digits. 7 The gains in Hispanic office-holding during the 198os and 199os
can be attributed in part to the passage and implementation of the Voting
Rights Act (VRA). The VRA facilitated the establishment of numerous
majority-minority districts, in which minority voters constitute a majority of
the relevant population, be it total population, voting-age population (VAP), or
citizen voting-age population (CVAP). 8 The electoral benefits of majority-
1. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic Population Passes 40 Million, Census Bureau
Reports (June 9, 2005), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/
population/o05164.html.
2. See U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Population by Race Alone and Hispanic or
Latino Origin for the United States and States: July 1, 2004 (Aug. 11, 2005),
http ://www.census.gov/popesqstates/asrh/SC-EST2oo4-o4.xls.
3. There are twenty-five Hispanics in the House of Representatives and three in the Senate.
4. David Lublin, Percent Hispanic Legislators in States Greater Than Ten Percent Hispanic,
http://www.american.edu/dlublin/redistricting/tabs.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). These
figures are up-to-date through the last election held in each seat prior to 2006. Id.
s. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 2.
6. Louis DeSipio, Latino Voters: Lessons Learned and Misunderstood, in THE UNFINISHED AGENDA
OF THE SELMA-MONTGOMERY VOTING RIGHTS MARCH 135, 139 (Editors of Black Issues in
Higher Education & Dara N. Byrne eds., 2005).
7. DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RAcIAL GERRYMANDERING AND
MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 25 (1997).
8. When this Note refers to a majority-minority district, it refers to those districts in which
minority voters constitute a majority of the total population. Many, if not most, scholars
have acknowledged that the creation of majority-minority districts was essential to Hispanic
and African-American electoral gains at the end of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Lisa
Handley et al., Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship
Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in
RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S 13, 37 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) (explaining that
gains in black and Hispanic representation "were due to the increase in the number of
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minority districts became evident after the 199o round of redistricting. State
legislatures constructed ten new majority-Latino districts, and shortly
thereafter seven Hispanic freshmen joined the House of Representatives. 9
Two provisions of the VRA were crucial to the creation and maintenance of
majority-minority districts: section 2 and section 5. Section 2 prohibits any
policy or practice that has the effect of giving racial minorities "less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice."'10 Under section 5, a state or subdivision
seeking to change a law or practice affecting voting must first preclear such a
change, either by submission to the Attorney General, or by filing for a
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Regardless of the method employed, the jurisdiction in question
must demonstrate that the proposed change does "not have the purpose and
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color" or membership in a language minority group.11 In contrast to
section 2, which applies throughout the United States, the protections of
section 5 of the VRA only apply to jurisdictions that have met a particular set of
threshold criteria known as a "triggering formula."' 2
The Supreme Court specified what section 5 required in Beer v. United
States, 3 in which the Court interpreted section 5 to prohibit only those changes
that would have a retrogressive effect on a minority community's "effective
exercise of the electoral franchise." 4 Until recently, courts considered any
majority minority districts" and "were not the result of additional minority representatives
being elected from majority white districts"); see also LUBLIN, supra note 7, at 23 ("The
growth in the number of black and Latino representatives closely tracks the rise in the
number of black and Latino majority districts.").
9. LUBLIN, supra note 7, at 25.
lo. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-11o, § 2, 79 Star. 437, 437 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000)).
ii. Id. § 5 (codified as amended at 4 2 U.S.C. § 1973C (2000)).
12. Initially, section 5 applied to jurisdictions that, as of November 1964, used voter literacy
tests and had a participation rate of less than 50% for eligible voters; this formula was later
extended to cover districts meeting these criteria in the 1968 and 1972 elections. PAST AND
PROLOGUE: NATIONAL CONFERENCE COMMEMORATING THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 S 3, at 2 (2005). In 1975, the triggering formula was further
broadened to include those jurisdictions conducting English-only elections, under the
reasoning that such elections constituted a prohibited "test or device" within the meaning of
section 4(c) of the VRA. Juan Cartagena, Latinos and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Beyond
Black and White, 18 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 201, 210-11 (2004).
13. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
14. Id. at 141.
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diminution in the ability of minority communities to elect candidates of their
choice to be retrogressive; this Note will refer to this as the "ability to elect"
standard."5 For proposed redistricting plans, the number of majority-minority
districts was critical evidence for assessing "ability to elect," such that a
proposed reduction in the number of such districts was persuasive evidence of
retrogression and hence of a section 5 violation.'
6
The reigning ability to elect standard was dethroned in 2003, when the
Supreme Court decided Georgia v. Ashcroft. 7 Justice O'Connor's opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
made two major changes to the section 5 preclearance doctrine. First, Justice
O'Connor expanded the ability to elect standard so that it would take into
account both districts where it is "highly likely" that a minority community
will be able to elect its candidate of choice, and other districts where "it is
likely-although perhaps not quite as likely" that minority communities will
succeed in electing their chosen candidate.' 8 Second, Justice O'Connor
restructured the section 5 inquiry such that ability to elect was merely one
prong in a larger "totality of the circumstances" test.' 9 After Georgia v. Ashcroft
covered jurisdictions could secure preclearance even if they had "unpacked"
majority-minority districts to create "coalitional districts," where minority
groups depend on coalitions with other voters to elect their candidates of
choice,2° or "influence districts," where minority voters are not able to elect
15. Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J.
21, 30 (2004).
16. Jocelyn Benson, Note, Turning Lemons into Lemonade: Making Georgia v. Ashcroft the
Mobile v. Bolden of 2oo7, 39 HAv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 485, 488 (2004) ("[A] redistricting
effort that reduced the overall number of majority-minority districts in a covered area,
particularly where voting was racially polarized, was found to have a retrogressive effect on
minority voters."); see also Tim Mellett et al., Dep't of Justice, Section 5 Recommendation
Memorandum 25-26 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/texasDOJmemo.pdf ("In the past ... the level of minority voting
strength protected under Section 5 consisted only of those districts in which minority voters
could reasonably be expected to elect their candidates of choice.").
17. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
18. Id. at 48o.
ig. Id. at 484.
20. In theory, the term "coalitional district" can be used to describe any district-even a
majority-minority district-in which minority voters require the support of white or other
minority voters to elect their candidate of choice. In practice, however, the term is typically
used to describe districts in which a minority group cofistitutes less than 50% of the relevant
population, be it total population, VAP, CVAP, or registered voters. See Richard H. Pildes, Is
Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself?. Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2ooos, 8o
N.C. L. REv. 1517, 1539 (2002) (defining coalitional districts as districts where black
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their candidates of choice, but could be swing voters in an election. Prior to
Georgia v. Ashcroft, preclearance for those jurisdictions would have been highly
unlikely.
Justice O'Connor defended this radical change in section 5 jurisprudence by
citing five sociological studies that she claimed suggested that "the most
effective way to maximize minority voting strength may be to create more
influence or coalitional districts."21 In part, these studies argued that increased
white support for black candidates- known as white "crossover voting"-
meant that black communities no longer needed majority-minority districts in
order to elect their candidates of choice;2" this would make less-concentrated
coalitional districts a viable alternative to majority-minority ones. The studies
further posited that the concentration of black voters in majority-minority
districts had led to the election of more conservative candidates in surrounding
districts, resulting in the decreased effectiveness of black representatives in
legislative bodies; 3 this tendency would call for the elimination of majority-
minority districts in favor of influence and coalitional districts.
I
registered voters are less than 50% of all registered voters and the remainder of the
registered voter population is non-Hispanic white). Most importantly, this appears to be the
definition favored by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Ashcroft, which spoke of coalitional
districts as "'communities in which minority citizens are able to form coalitions with voters
from other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority within a single district in
order to elect candidates of their choice.'" 539 U.S. at 481 (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy,
512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (emphasis added)). This Note will use the term to refer to
districts where minorities are less than 50% of the total population.
21. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 482. The five studies cited were: CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK
INTERESTS 193-234 (1995); Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize
Substantive Black Representation in Congress? 90 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 794, 8o8 (1996); Bernard
Grofman et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some
Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383 (2001); David Lublin, Racial Redistricting and
African-American Representation: A Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize
Substantive Black Representation in Congress?," 93 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 183, 185 (1999); Pildes,
supra note 2o, at 1517.
22. See, e.g., Cameron et al., supra note 21, at 8o8 ("[D]istricts that are a bit less than majority-
minority give black representatives a substantial chance of winning office . . . while
supporting minority influence in other districts."); Pildes, supra note 2o, at 1522 (noting the
rise of a "significant percentage of white voters . . . who regularly cast votes for black
candidates running against white competitors"). The qualifier "in part" is used because
portions of these studies are critical of this proposition. See Grofman et a., supra note 21, at
1423 (warning that white support for a black incumbent would not necessarily carry over to
black candidates running for open seats); Lublin, supra note 21, at 183 (cautioning that
Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran's study "underestimate[s] severely the percentage of
blacks needed to assure the probable election of an African American").
23. Again, not all five studies concur on this point. See Lublin, supra note 21, at 185 (suggesting
that such an effect should be limited to the South); see also Cameron et al., supra note 21, at
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Georgia v. Ashcroft triggered a strong response from a number of scholars,
who countered that the purported benefits of coalitional or influence districts
were poor substitutes for the proven gains of majority-minority districts. 4 As
Juan Cartagena has observed, however, because the facts of the case involved
the black community in Georgia, the most forceful critiques of Georgia v.
Ashcroft have focused on the decision's impact on black voters.2" Thus, a critical
gap in Justice O'Connor's reasoning has gone unnoticed: Even though Georgia
v. Ashcroft applies to all minority groups, not one of the studies cited by Justice
O'Connor deals at any significant length with the effectiveness of coalitional or
influence districts in Hispanic-rather than black- communities. Given that
jurisdictions covered by section 5 are home to almost as many Hispanics as
African-Americans, this is a particularly glaring oversight. 2
6
This Note asks the questions that Justice O'Connor did not consider: Is
there reliable evidence that the best way to maximize Hispanic voting strength
is to create more Hispanic coalitional and influence districts? If not, what
impact will Georgia v. Ashcroft have on the Hispanic community? To date, only
a handful of scholars have addressed these issues at any length. None,
however, has identified the evidentiary gap at the core of Justice O'Connor's
holding, nor has anyone accounted for the demographic and electoral attributes
uniquely salient in the Latino community and considered whether -in light of
those characteristics -the premises of Georgia v. Ashcroft are equally applicable
to Latinos.
807-809 (providing empirical findings to support this hypothesis); id. at 794
("[Concentrated minority districts] dilute minority influence in surrounding areas, which
may then elect representatives unsympathetic to minority concerns.").
24. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 16; Karlan, supra note i5; Bernard Grofman, A Citizen's
Dissent: Potential Long-Term Problems with the Approach to Section 5 taken in Georgia v.
Ashcroft (May 25, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
25. Cartagena, supra note 12, at 217.
26. Figures from the 2000 census show that 11,353,045 individuals identified as Hispanic and
13,9o6,777 individuals identified as non-Hispanic black reside in jurisdictions covered by
section 5. See infra tbl. 1.
27. While their analyses were more limited in scope-Grofman's consisting of a single
footnote-the three scholars who have addressed Georgia's impact on Hispanics have
cautioned that moving away from majority-minority districts and toward coalitional or
influence districts may be premature in the Latino context. Benson, supra note 16, at 495-96
(citing evidence that "majority-minority districts are important for Black candidates but are
even more crucial to the success of Latino and Asian American candidates"); Cartagena,
supra note 12, at 222 & n.135; Grofman et al., supra note 21, at 12 n.13 ("A legal climate that
discourages the creation of new majority-minority districts will have its greatest impact on
Hispanic representation.").
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This Note finds that coalitional and influence districts are poorly suited to
enable Latino voters to elect their candidates of choice, and indeed do little to
empower Latino voters in general. Instead, majority-minority districts remain
the primary means through which Hispanic communities can elect their
preferred candidates. In light of these findings, this Note goes on to discuss
two strategies - one for Congress, one for courts - to repair the deficiencies of
Georgia v. Ashcroft and prevent the unwarranted elimination of Hispanic-
majority districts.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I examines the evidentiary
foundations of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Part II "fills in the gap," creating a
profile of the Hispanic electorate to assess the effectiveness of coalitional and
influence districts in the Hispanic context, and hence evaluating Georgia v.
Ashcroft's likely impact on the Hispanic community. Part III presents two
strategies to avoid possible damage caused by the opinion. Finally, the
Conclusion offers some broader observations on the administration of section 5
and the VRA in "other" minority contexts.
I. MISSING HALF OF THE STORY
Despite the fact that Georgia v. Ashcroft applies to all minority voters," its
holding was predicated on selective evidence drawn solely from the African-
American community. Justice O'Connor missed half of the story.
In this Part, I briefly describe the redistricting process that sparked Georgia
v. Ashcroft and explain the mechanics of the opinion itself. I then explore the
foundations of Justice O'Connor's opinion, elaborating on the critiques of
majority-minority districts that Justice O'Connor used to justify her emphasis
on coalitional and influence districts. Finally, I show how these critiques- and
the opinion itself- did not consider the experiences of the Latino community.
A. The Mechanics of the Decision
The legal dispute that led to Georgia v. Ashcrofi originated in the post-2ooo
redistricting of the Georgia State Senate. At the start of the redistricting cycle
in 2000, Georgia's districting plan included thirteen senate districts in which
blacks constituted a majority of the total population, twelve of which had a
majority black voting-age population (BVAP). The goal of the Democratic
leadership in preparing for the redistricting process was to maintain the
number of black majority-minority districts-thus avoiding a section 5
28. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,482 (2003).
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objection- and simultaneously to increase the overall number of seats held by
Democrats. Senate Democrats sought to accomplish this goal by unpacking the
most heavily concentrated black-majority districts and allocating the unpacked
black voters to surrounding districts. The plan that Democrats in the Georgia
Assembly ultimately passed maintained thirteen black-majority districts,
drawing those districts such that every one would have a majority BVAP. Five
of those districts, however, had been significantly unpacked such that they now
included less than 6o% BVAP.29
The State of Georgia, a jurisdiction covered by section 5, filed an action in
the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment
that the State Senate plan did not violate the VRA. The Department of Justice
objected, arguing that changes to three specific districts impermissibly diluted
the ability of black voters to elect their candidates of choice; previously ranging
from 55% to 63%, the BVAP of the districts in question would be reduced to
just over 5o% under the proposed state senate plan. ° Although the plan was
eventually revised and precleared with black voters added to all three districts,
Georgia appealed to the Supreme Court to have its original plan reinstated."
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion radically altered the section 5
preclearance standard, and remanded the original state senate plan for
consideration under this new standard. 32 First, Georgia v. Ashcroft expanded the
ability to elect test, stating that a redistricting plan that reduced the number of
majority-minority districts could offset this reduction in ability to elect by
creating coalitional districts where minority voters would make up less than
So% of a district, but could possibly elect their candidates of choice by forming
coalitions with voters from other racial or ethnic groups. 33
Second, Justice O'Connor made the more drastic argument that the validity
of a plan under section 5 should not turn entirely on the plan's effect on
minority voters' "ability to elect," but rather on the "totality of the
29. Id. at 469-71.
30. Id. at 472-73.
31. Id. at 47S. Note that section 5 cases are brought exclusively before three-judge panels in the
District Court for the District of Columbia, with appeals directly to the Supreme Court. 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
32. As explained above, the preclearance process had previously focused on a determination of
the proposed plan's effect on minority voters' ability to elect their candidate of choice. This
meant that in section S redistricting cases, a decrease in the number of majority-minority
districts would likely have been deemed "retrogressive" and resulted in the denial of
preclearance. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
33. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 481-83.
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circumstances, ' '3 4 including the plan's effect on minority voters' "opportunity
to participate in the political process," and "the feasibility of creating a
nonretrogressive plan."3" Under this totality of the circumstances test, a
decrease in the number of majority-minority districts (and presumably the
number of coalitional districts) could be offset by the creation of so-called
influence districts where "minority voters may not be able to elect a candidate
of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral
process."36  This is because these districts would purportedly increase
minorities' "opportunity to participate in the political process."3 7 In simpler
terms, ability to elect -previously the cornerstone of section 5 preclearance
analysis-was both (1) expanded and (2) made merely one prong in a three-
part totality of the circumstances test.
B. Justice O'Connor's Evidentiaty Foundations
Justice O'Connor grounded these radical changes by asserting that "the
most effective way to maximize minority voting strength may be to create more
influence or coalitional districts.""' She cited five studies in support of this
proposition. While not exclusively supportive of Justice O'Connor's stance,39
taken as a whole these studies aptly summarized the two academic critiques of
majority-minority districts prior to Georgia v. Ashcrofi: the "perverse effects"
theory and the "crossover effects" theory. The former justified the use of
influence districts; the latter supported the creation of coalitional districts.
1. The Alleged Harms of Majority-Minority Districts
Prior to Georgia v. Ashcroft, critics of majority-minority districts claimed
that by concentrating minority voters into a small set of districts, majority-
minority districting plans "bleached" surrounding districts and thus
34. Id. at 484 ("[A] court or the Department of Justice should assess the totality of
circumstances in determining retrogression under § 5.").
3S- Id. at 479.
36. Id. at 482. Justice O'Connor also suggested that such a decrease in minority voters' ability to
elect could be offset by "[m]aintaining or increasing legislative positions of power for
minority voters' representatives of choice." Id. at 484.
37. Id. at 482.
38. Id. at 482.
39. See supra notes 22-23.
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guaranteed the election of officials unsympathetic to minority interests. 4 °
These critics usually cited the experience of the African-American community,
arguing that the isolation of black Democrats in concentrated majority-black
districts had led to white Republican victories in neighboring areas and
Republican-dominated legislatures unsympathetic to black interests. 41 Hence,
they posited that the black "descriptive" representation brought about by
majority-minority districting-the presence of black officials in legislatures-
inevitably led to losses in "substantive" representation- the ability of
legislators to pass legislation favorable to African-Americans.42 Much of the
literature critiquing majority-minority districting attempted to corroborate this
alleged trade-off between descriptive and substantive representation,
identifying Democratic seats apparently lost due to majority-minority
districting, 43 and looking at floor votes to prove that such districting led to
policy outcomes unfavorable to black voters.44 This theory of the inadvertent
40. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., SWAIN, supra note 21, at 205 ("To the extent that the black Democrats are
concentrated in legislative districts, it is easier for Republican candidates to win more seats
overall. . . The more 'lily-white' the districts so drained become, the easier it is for
Republicans to win them."); Cameron et al., supra note 21, at 8o8 (arguing that "substantive
minority representation" is hurt by majority-minority districting); Pildes, supra note 2o, at
1558 ("Concentrating black voters into safe majorities tends to hurt the Democratic Party
across a state as a whole because too many of the party's most loyal voters have been safely
confined to one district."); see also LUBLIN, supra note 7, at 97 ("In the South, racial
redistricting packs black liberal voters into districts and makes the surrounding districts
more white and conservative."). Note that the Cameron study bases its conclusions on
quantitative data drawn solely from black-white contests. Cameron et al., supra note 21, at
8o8.
42. Cameron et al., supra note 21, at 794 ("[Mlajority-minority districts may increase the
number of minority legislators but decrease the number of votes in support of minority
legislation. . . . [T]here may be a trade-off between descriptive and substantive
representation."); see also SWAIN, supra note 21, at 210 ("Black faces in political office do not
guarantee the substantive representation of the policy preferences of the majority of African
Americans.").
43. David Lublin calculated that majority-black districts cost Democrats eleven seats in the 1992
and 1994 congressional elections. Lublin, supra note 21, at 185. Carol Swain, writing in 1993,
estimated that the loss of seventeen Democratic seats can be "directly attributed to the
creation of majority-black districts" in the post-199o redistricting process. SWAIN, supra
note 21, at 227.
44. See Cameron et al., supra note 21, at 81o ("[P]ast a certain point, an increase in the number
of minority representatives comes at the cost of votes in favor of minority-sponsored
legislation."); Lublin, supra note 21, at 185 (arguing that Democratic losses in 1992 and 1994
made the House of Representatives less likely to adopt initiatives supported by blacks).
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harms of majority-minority districting is known as the perverse effects
hypothesis.4"
By definition, an influence district is highly unlikely to elect a minority
community's chosen candidate. 6 Nevertheless, using the perverse effects
theory, Justice O'Connor's totality of the circumstances test presents these
districts as viable alternatives to majority-minority districts. Admitting that
influence districts would not generally allow the election of minority groups'
candidates of choice-and hence have no positive impact on minority voters'
ability to elect-Justice O'Connor reasoned that influence districts would
"[increase] the number of representatives sympathetic to the interests of
minority voters," hence improving minority voters' ability to participate in the
political process.47
2. The Reduced Need for Majority-Minority Districts
The second prong of the critique of majority-minority districts posited that
they were no longer necessary in light of allegedly declining levels of racially
polarized voting. Critics of majority-minority districts typically argued that
black candidates increasingly received the support of white "crossover" votes
and that, therefore, black voters no longer needed majority-black districts to
elect their candidates of choice. 4s The critics thus alleged that the redistricting
provisions of the VRA that protected majority-minority districts had served
their purpose, and that today they could be obstacles to greater substantive
representation, or to the formation of valuable interracial coalitions.4 9 Hence
45. See Delia Grigg & Jonathan N. Katz, The Impact of Majority-Minority Districts on
Congressional Elections 1 (Apr. 4, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). But
see id. at 9, 13 (presenting evidence refuting this hypothesis).
46. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003) ("[A] court must examine whether a new plan
adds or subtracts 'influence districts' - where minority voters may not be able to elect a
candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process.").
47. Id. at 483.
48. See, e.g., Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of Racial Districting and the
Future of Black Representation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209, 1253 (1999) ("As long as white crossover
rates outpace black crossovers, and black and white registration rates are roughly equal,
African-Americans will not need majority-black districts to win."); Pildes, supra note 20, at
1529 (noting that some have argued that a drop in racially polarized voting "permits a
meaningful level of white-black coalitional politics," enabling black candidates to get elected
from non-majority-black districts); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
49. See Cameron et al., supra note 21, at 798 (arguing that majority-black districts may actually
"hinder the formation of the biracial liberal coalitions that were the impetus behind the
original civil rights campaign"); Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a
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Professor Richard Pildes's provocative question: "Is voting rights law now at
war with itself?""0
The crossover effects hypothesis provided the basis for Justice O'Connor's
broadening of the ability to elect prong to allow for the creation of coalitional
districts in lieu of majority-minority ones; the underlying premise of
coalitional districts is that such coalitions are possible in the first place. Thus,
Justice O'Connor tellingly quoted from Johnson v. De Grandy, in which the
Court found that "there are communities in which minority citizens are able to
form coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no
need to be a majority within a single district in order to elect candidates of their
choice."s"
C. The Absence ofLatinos in Georgia v. Ashcroft
Justice O'Connor's reliance on the five studies-and the critique of
majority-minority districts that they present-is notable for two reasons. First,
while these studies draw heavily on data from black communities, particularly
those in the South, 2 Justice O'Connor ignored a large body of contradictory
evidence suggesting that it is extremely difficult for black candidates to get
elected outside of majority-minority districts, and that coalitional districts are
relatively ineffective for African-Americans. 3
More surprising, however, is Justice O'Connor's complete disregard for
Hispanic communities. Not one of the studies cited by Justice O'Connor deals
at any significant length with the effectiveness of coalitional and influence
Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1710, 1731 (2004) ("The emerging conclusion
is that section 5 has served its purposes and may now be impeding the type of political
developments that could have been only a distant aspiration when the VRA was passed in
1965.")
50. Pildes, supra note 20, at 1517.
51. 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (quoted in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 481 (2003)).
52. The Grofman, Lublin, and Pildes studies were primarily based upon evidence from black-
white electoral contests in the South. Grofman et al., supra note 21, at 1394 (focusing on
black districts in the South in the 199os); Lublin, supra note 21, at 184 ("Since all but one of
the new black districts created during the 199o redistricting round were in the South, I will
focus primarily on the results for this region."); Pildes, supra note 20, at 1522 ("The 199os
saw the real emergence of a robust, genuine two-party political system across most contests
in the South....").
53. See, e.g., LUBLIN, supra note 7, at 45 ("The election of an African American from a non-
majority-minority district is an incredibly unlikely event."); Handley et al., supra note 8, at
37 ("[We have found no evidence to indicate that majority minority districts are no longer
necessary to ensure African-American and Hispanics fair representation in our legislative
bodies.").
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districts in the Hispanic - rather than black - context. Two of the studies make
little or no reference to Latinos: Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran's essay
never once uses the words "Latino" or "Hispanic" ;14 those same terms appear a
total of five times in the body of Professor Pildes' fifty-seven page article. 5
Carol Swain and David Lublin do make brief mentions of Hispanics,S6 but both
do so exclusively in the context of the electoral experience of African-
Americans.' The one study that briefly addresses the effectiveness of
coalitional districts in the Hispanic context explicitly cautions that such
districts may be insufficient to provide Hispanic voters an opportunity to elect
their candidates of choice. 8
The absence of Latinos in these studies -which provide the factual and
theoretical basis for Justice O'Connor's holding -is highly problematic. While
section 5 jurisprudence is typically thought of as a "black issue," 9 figures from
the 2000 census show that covered jurisdictions are home to almost as many
Hispanics as African-Americans.6" Justice O'Connor's holding in Georgia v.
Ashcroft may affect 13.9 million African-Americans, but it also affects well over
11 million Hispanics. 6' Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor did not weigh or
54. See Cameron et al., supra note 21.
55. See Pildes, supra note 20. Two of the occurrences of "Hispanic" come in the phrase "non-
Hispanic white." Id. at 1539, 1568.
56. SWAIN, supra note 21, at 226-34; Lublin, supra note 21, at 183-84, 186.
57. Lublin, for example, does mention Hispanics, but only to discuss the beneficial effect of
Hispanic communities on African-American candidates running in minority-black districts.
See Lublin, supra note 21, at 183-84.
58. See Grofman et al., supra note 21, at 1391 (citing evidence that "due primarily to lower citizen
voting age eligibility rates among Hispanics, Hispanic population percentages well above
50% may be needed to provide Hispanic voters with an equal opportunity to elect candidates
of choice").
59. Cartagena, supra note 12, at 202.
60. See infra tbl. 1.
61. Id. Given the VRA's historical roots in the black civil rights movement, some would argue
that Justice O'Connor's emphasis on the African-American community was understandable.
While the VRA was primarily conceived as a means to empower the African-American
community, one should not understate the role of Hispanics in the establishment and
development of the VRA. Juan Cartagena has meticulously shown that in 1965, Puerto
Rican politicians and voting rights advocates successfully pushed for a provision in the
VRA - section 4(e) - that guaranteed that Puerto Rican voters educated in Spanish-language
schools would be allowed to vote in American English-only elections. Cartagena has also
documented how lawyers from the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund used this
provision and the precedents arising out of it to successfully lobby for the expansion of
section 5 to jurisdictions conducting English-only elections. See Cartagena, supra note 12, at
204-12. This expansion of the VRA in 1975 led to the section 5 coverage of Texas, today the
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consider their experiences. The following Part will show why this was a critical
mistake.
II. FILLING IN THE GAP
This Part considers whether Justice O'Connor's assertion -that "the best
way to maximize minority voting strength may be to create more influence or
coalitional districts ''62 - holds in the Latino context. This inquiry is divided into
several parts. Section III.A provides a profile of the Hispanic electorate,
identifying salient demographic and behavioral differences between the black
and Hispanic electorates. The following two Sections use that profile to assess
whether coalitional and influence districts actually maximize the voting
strength of the Latino electorate. This Part concludes that coalitional and
influence districts are highly ineffective for Latinos, both in terms of electing
Latino candidates and in allowing Latinos to participate in electoral politics.
Instead, the Hispanic population's unique combination of demographic
characteristics creates a situation in which robust majority-minority districts
constitute their primary-if not their only-avenue for electoral success. In
light of these findings, the final Section discusses why Georgia v. Ashcroft may
be particularly damaging to the Latino electorate.
A. A Comparative Profile of the Hispanic Electorate
There are at least four characteristics of the Hispanic electorate that may
cause Hispanics to be particularly reliant on majority-minority districts and
highly prejudiced by their elimination -perhaps even more so than their black
counterparts.
First, the Hispanic population is crippled by high levels of voter
ineligibility, at rates unseen among whites or African-Americans. In a recent
report, the Pew Hispanic Center found that only 39% of Latinos are eligible to
vote, compared to 65% of blacks and 76% of whites. 6' As the Hispanic
population is disproportionately young, the size of the Latino electorate is
most populous jurisdiction subject to section 5. See infra tbl. 1. Cartagena concluded: "The
truth is that the Voting Rights Act... was initially and deservedly aimed at restoring the
dignity of African-American voters, but even in 1965, it was never just black and white."
Cartagena, supra note 12, at 201.
62. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,482 (2003).
63. ROBERTO SURO ET AL., PEw HISPANIC CTR., HISPANICS AND THE 2004 ELECTION:
POPULATION, ELECTORATE AND VOTERS 5 (2O05), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/
reports/48.pdf.
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reduced by age-based ineligibility. Thirty-four percent of the Hispanic
population cannot vote due to age alone.6 4 The remaining 27% are disqualified
from voting due to noncitizenship.6 s
Table i.
HISPANIC AND BLACK POPULATIONS IN JURISDICTIONS COVERED BY SECTION 
566
Fully Covered States
Alabama 75,830 1,162,189 4,447,100
Alaska 25,852 25,733 626,932
Arizona 1,295,617 170,191 5,130,632
Georgia 435,227 2,369,427 8,186,453
Louisiana 107,738 1,457,805 4,468,976
Mississippi 39,569 1,035,627 2,844,658
South Carolina 95,076 1,192,592 4,012,012
Texas 6,669,666 2,429,966 20,851,820
64. Id. at 5. Thirty-one percent of non-Hispanic blacks and 22% of non-Hispanic whites were
ineligible to vote due to age. Id. at 6.
65. Id. at 5. Only 4% of non-Hispanic blacks and 2% of non-Hispanic whites are disqualified
from voting due to noncitizenship. Id. at 6. While noncitizens are unable to vote, they are
counted for redistricting purposes. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
Congress to apportion representatives by "counting the whole number of persons in each
State," making no mention of citizenship status. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also U.S.
Census Bureau, Questions and Answers on Apportionment, http ://
www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/apportionment/faq.html#02 (last visited
Apr. 14, 20o6) ("The apportionment calculation is based upon the total resident population
(citizens and non-citizens) of the 50 states.").
66. I generated a customized table using data from "Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) loo-
Percent Data," which is available at U.S. Census Bureau, United States-Data Sets-
American FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?-Iang=en (follow
"get data" hyperlink under "Decennial Census" heading) (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). VRA-
covered jurisdictions are listed at U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Section 5
Covered Jurisdictions, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/covered.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006). Black population figures include all non-Hispanic individuals identifying as
black alone or as black in combination with another race.
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Partially Covered States
California 350,345 37,837 8Ol,996
Florida 265,488 174,774 1,393,o62
Michigan 1,564 5,820 12,422
New Hampshire 130 114 16,167
New York 1,550,399 1,554,764 5,335,171
North Carolina 124,730 884,313 2,916,502
South Dakota 315 34 21,516
Virginia 315,499 1,405,591 6,698,349
Total 11,353,045 13,9o6,777 67,763,768
Second, the Latino population suffers from participation rates lower than
those of non-Hispanic black and white populations, in terms of both voter
registration and election day turnout. While turnout rates among Hispanics are
lower than those among whites and blacks,6 7 low registration rates among
eligible voters pose the biggest problem. Only 58% of eligible Latino voters
were registered to vote in 2004, compared to 75% of whites and 69% of
blacks.68 Experts attribute these low participation rates to the fact that, like
African-Americans, Hispanics are disproportionately young, less educated, and
less affluent-all attributes that traditionally dampen political participation.6 q
For Hispanics, these factors are exacerbated by language barriers. The
combined effect of low voter eligibility and participation is devastating: Only
67. SURO ET AL., supra note 63, at 6-7.
68. Id. at 6.
69. See Louis DeSipio & Rodolfo 0. de la Garza, Between Symbolism and Influence: Latinos and the
2000 Elections, in MUTED VOICES: LATINOS AND THE 2000 ELECTIONS 13, 21-22 (Rodolfo 0. de
la Garza & Louis DeSipio eds., 2005) (discussing the impact of youth, education, and
poverty on Latino participation rates); Rodolfo 0. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Save the
Baby, Change the Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral Participation After Twenty
Years of Voting Rights Act Coverage, in PURSUING POwER: LATINOS AND THE POLITICAL
SYSTEM 72, 103-07 (F. Chris Garcia ed., 1997) [hereinafter de la Garza & DeSipio, Save the
Baby] (same).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:2112 20o6
THE UNFORESEEN EFFECTS OF GEORGIA V. ASHCROFT
18% of all Hispanics voted in 2004, compared to 5i% of whites and 39% of
blacks, and Hispanics only contributed 6% of all the ballots cast on election
day.70
Third, Hispanic voters are not as politically cohesive as African-American
voters. Hispanics may predominantly identify as Democrats (among registered
voters, self-identified Democrats outnumber Republicans two to one71), but
Latinos do not exhibit the same degree of support for Democratic candidates as
African-Americans. In the 2004 elections, for example, Senator John Kerry
garnered an impressive 88% of the African-American vote, but only gained the
support of slightly more than half (53%) of Hispanic voters.72 While these
particular figures73 and the results of this particular election74 are not to be
overemphasized, few can contest that Latinos are less politically cohesive than
African-Americans.
Fourth and finally, the Hispanic population has experienced a pattern of
growth distinct from that of the African-American population, and indeed
most other populations in the United States. The Hispanic population has
undergone a dramatic increase in the past few decades, more than doubling in
size between 198o and 2ooo.7 5 Over 20 million Latinos were added to census
rolls in those two decades, compared to 14 million non-Hispanic whites, and
7.5 million non-Hispanic blacks. 76 Additionally, instead of settling in
concentrated Latino enclaves, census figures suggest that Hispanics are more
likely to live in areas where they do not constitute a majority of the
70. SURO ETAL., supra note 63, at 6, 8.
71. PEw HISPANIC CTR. & KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE 2004 NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS:
POLITICS AND CMc PARTICIPATION 2 (2004), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/
reports/33.pdf.
72. CNN.com, Election 2004, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2oo4/pages/results/states/US/
P/oo/epolls.o.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
73. See Memorandum from the Nat'l Council of La Raza to Interested Parties, How Did Latinos
Really Vote in 2004? (Nov. 16, 2004), available at http://nclr.org/content/publications/
download/28218 (critiquing evidence from the National Election Pool exit poll that CNN
and other news sources relied upon).
74. See Louis DeSipio & Rodolfo 0. de la Garza, Forever Seen as New: Latino Participation in
American Elections, in LATINOS: REMAKING AMERICA 398, 402-03 (Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco
ed., 2002) (noting that Latino support for Republican politicians like George W. Bush and
John McCain is generally an exception to the rule of Latino Democratic partisanship).
75. PEW HISPANIC CTR., HISPANICS: A PEOPLE IN MOTION 4 (2o05), available at http://
pewhispanic.org/files/reports/4o.pdf.
76. Id.
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population. 77 While this trend may eventually reverse, Latinos at the current
moment are more residentially dispersed than African-Americans.78
B. Implications for Districting in the Hispanic Context
Latinos' demographic and electoral attributes affect the voting strength that
coalitional, influence, and majority-minority districts can provide. Standing
alone, these characteristics render Latino coalitional and influence districts
highly ineffective. Speaking comparatively, this profile suggests that even if
coalitional and influence districts actually maximize African-American voting
strength - an unwarranted assumption - the same will not necessarily be true
of Latinos.
1. The Failure of Hispanic Coalitional Districts
Evaluating the voting strength provided by coalitional districts is
straightforward. The Georgia v. Ashcroft Court sanctioned the creation of
coalitional districts in lieu of majority-minority districts by expanding the
ability to elect prong. Hence, a coalitional district increases a minority group's
voting strength insofar as it enhances a minority group's ability to elect its
candidate of choice. This can be measured in two ways: (i) levels of crossover
support for Hispanics, and (2) the success rates of Hispanic candidates in
Hispanic coalitional districts. This Subsection will evaluate each in turn.
Sufficient levels of crossover support are difficult to attain for Hispanics.
Due to high rates of ineligibility and disengagement, Hispanics in a Hispanic
coalitional district would need massive levels of crossover support from non-
Hispanic whites and blacks. Based on average ineligibility rates, 79 a coalitional
district with a 40% Latino total population and a 60% white population
translates into a district with a 25% Latino citizen voting age population
(CVAP) and a 75% white CVAP. In fact, since Hispanics have higher
ineligibility rates and lower participation rates than blacks, assuming a
generalized increase in crossover support for minority candidates, Latinos in a
Latino coalition district would need to receive more crossover support than
77. ROBERTO SURo & SONYA TAFOYA, PEW HISPANIC CTR., DISPERSAL AND CONCENTRATION:
PATTERNS OF LATINO RESIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT 1 (2004), available at http://pewhispanic.
org/files/reports/36.pdf.
78. Id. at 2; Robert R. Brischetto, Latino Voters and Redistricting in the New Millennium, in
REDISTRICTING AND MINoRMrY REPRESENTATION 43, s6 (David A. Bositis ed., 1998).
79. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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their black counterparts in a similarly apportioned black coalition district to
enjoy the same likelihood of electing their candidate of choice. This level of
crossover support seems intuitively unlikely.
While there is admittedly little aggregate data on precise levels of white
crossover support for Hispanic candidates in Hispanic coalitional districts,so
the existing data does not reflect significant levels of crossover support for
Hispanics, let alone levels that would offset the differences in the eligibility and
participation rates between Hispanics and blacks.8' There is one putative
exception to this rule. Several studies suggest that in California, Latino
candidates may benefit from high levels of crossover support.s Nevertheless,
these studies primarily rely on anecdotal evidence, 8' and must be weighed
against convincing econometric findings reaching the opposite conclusion. 4 In
8o. Bruce Cain and Kenneth Miller have explained that as a quickly growing "other minority"
group, Hispanics have often not inhabited a jurisdiction sufficiently long enough such that
it is possible to develop a clear record of voting discrimination. Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P.
Miller, Voting Rights Mismatch: The Challenge of Applying the Voting Rights Act to "Other
Minorities," in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 141, 146-47 (Mark
E. Rush ed., 1998).
81. See Brischetto, supra note 78, at 50 ("[T]here seems to be no trend toward lessening of
polarized voting [against Latinos] during the [past] three decades."). Indeed, racially
polarized voting-the opposite of crossover support-remains rampant and well-
documented in places like Texas. See Symposium, Drawing Lines in the Sand: The Texas
Latino Community and Redistricting 2001, 6 TEx. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 50-51 (2OO1). For a
discussion of the "Republican Primary Curse" in Texas, a euphemistic term to describe the
consistent defeat of promising-and even GOP-backed -Hispanic candidates by
underfunded, almost clearly inferior white Republican opponents, see Rodolfo Rosales et
al., Report on San Antonio Hearings Related to the Extension and/or Expansion of the
Federal Voting Rights Act 21-22 (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
82. Leo F. Estrada, Making the Voting Rights Act Relevant to the New Demographics of America: A
Response to Farrell and Johnson, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1283, 1289 (2001) ("Latinos ...have
demonstrated their ability to win elections in non-Latino districts more so than other ethnic
groups."). Another scholar has implied the same without directly stating so. See J. Morgan
Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law,
27 U.S.F. L. REv. 551, 566-67 (1993) (citing Latino congressional and State Assembly
victories in California districts where Latinos constituted a minority of registered voters); see
also Cano v. Davis, 211 F. Supp. 2d 12o8, 1247 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding that California's
electoral system is "far from closed to Latinos"). The court in Cano also found extensive
evidence of substantial white crossover voting in favor of Latinos in two regions in
California. Id. at 1243.
83. See Estrada, supra note 82, at 1289 n.30 (listing successful Latina candidates from non-
Latino-majority districts in California); Kousser, supra note 82, at 566-67 (same).
84. See Yishaiya Absoch et al., An Assessment of Racially Polarized Voting for and Against
Latino Candidates 28-30 (Feb. 9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
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any event, scholars generally regard California as an exception to the rule in
terms of redistricting."s Overall, then, while there has been scattered evidence
of increased white crossover support for black voters' candidates of choice 6-
evidence that has been criticized by voting rights scholars"' - there has been no
reliable evidence of comparable gains for Hispanic voters.
The general ineffectiveness of coalitional districts is underscored by
evidence from electoral contests in Hispanic coalitional districts. David Lublin
found that of 5,19o congressional races between 1972 and 1994, Latinos only
won 29 races (o.6%) outside of majority-Latino districts.8 8 Moreover, all
except one of the Hispanic candidates who won in Latino-minority districts ran
in majority-minority districts made up of a mix of minority groups within
which Latinos constituted a prominent plurality of voters.8s
There is little evidence that coalitional districts work to maximize Hispanic
voting strength: Crossover support for Hispanics has proven insufficient, and
Latinos are rarely, if ever, elected from supposedly "coalitional" Latino
districts.
2. The Empty Promise of Hispanic Influence Districts
It is more difficult to evaluate the voting strength provided by Hispanic
influence districts. Influence districts never result in the election of a minority
(finding that "non-Latinos voted substantially against the Latino preferred candidate or
issue" in thirteen elections in Los Angeles County from 1994 to 2003).
85. See, e.g., Cartagena, supra note 12, at 220; Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Preconditions for
Black and Hispanic Congressional Success, in UNITED STATES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THEIR
IMPACT ON WOMEN AND MINORITIES 31, 37 (Wilma Rule & Joseph F. Zimmerman eds.,
1992) ("Hispanics generally are not elected to Congress from districts that are less than 64
percent combined minority except in California and New Mexico.").
86. See supra notes 22, 48 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 16, at 496-97 (critiquing Richard Pildes's use of ambiguous
data on racially polarized voting).
88. LUBLIN, supra note 7, at 48. Lublin made comparable, though slightly more favorable,
findings for African-Americans. Id. at 41 (finding that African-Americans won 72 out of
5,079 races (1.4%) held outside of majority-black districts).
89. Id. at 49. The support of black voters can partially explain the initial success of Latino
officials like Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, who first ran for Congress in a
district with a 42% Hispanic population and a 14% African-American population. See Page v.
Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 356 (D.N.J. 2001). One scholar attributes Senator Menendez's
subsequent success -prior to being appointed to the Senate, Menendez served seven terms
in the House of Representatives and was elected chairman of the House Democratic
Caucus-to the power of incumbency. Juan Cartagena, New Jersey's Multi-Member Legislative
Districts and Latino Political Power, 7 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. (forthcoming 2006).
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group's candidate of choice, and so cannot be understood to maximize a
minority group's voting strength, traditionally defined. This is why Justice
O'Connor placed influence districts under the opportunity to participate"
prong of the totality of the circumstances test, and not the ability to elect
prong. 9° Instead, the benefits afforded by influence districts are grounded in
the perverse effects hypothesis, the idea that majority-minority districts harm
minority groups' substantive representation (their ability to pass bills that
support their agenda)91 and thus should be dismantled. 92 In a sense, then, the
voting strength provided by Hispanic influence districts turns on the validity of
the perverse effects theory in the Hispanic context.
At first glance, the perverse effects theory appears self-evident. It seems
reasonable that by packing progressive minority voters into a small set of
districts, a greater number of conservative officials will be elected in
surrounding districts. In reality, however, the dual propositions central to the
perverse effects theory- (i) that concentrating minority voters into majority-
minority districts will harm those minority voters' overall substantive
representation, and (2) that unpacking those districts to create influence
districts will benefit that substantive representation by making minority voters
a viable "swing" constituency - are highly contingent upon two specific factors.
First, concentrating minority voters into majority-minority districts will
only harm those voters' substantive interests if the minority voters are
sufficiently Democratic, and the neighboring nonminority voters sufficiently
Republican, 93 such that the concentration of minority voters into majority-
minority districts -and hence their separation from neighboring nonminority
voters-will result in the election of more conservative officials in the
surrounding districts. This specific set of circumstances may hold in some
regions, but not in others. Indeed, David Lublin has pointed out -in an article
that Justice O'Connor cited 94 - that while the concentration of black voters in
Southern states may result in conservative electoral outcomes in surrounding
districts, such concentrations will not necessarily have the same effect in the
go. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003) (stating that influence districts provide
minority groups an opportunity to "play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral
process").
91. See supra notes 45-48 for a more extended discussion of substantive representation.
92. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
93- I acknowledge that the default labeling of minorities as Democrats and nonminorities as
Republicans can be misleading. These assumptions are made here for the sake of simplicity,
and in recognition of the fact that African-Americans and Hispanics do in fact tend to vote
Democratic. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
94. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 482 (citing Lublin, supra note 21).
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North, where black voters are often surrounded by liberal -yet non-African-
American -Jewish and Latino voters. 9'
Second, any substantive benefit that a minority group may gain from being
unpacked and placed in an influence district is highly contingent upon the
responsiveness of the nonminority legislators representing (or candidates vying
to represent) the district. As Pamela Karlan has asserted, the dynamics of an
influence district will not necessarily make minority voters a coveted swing
constituency: In a race between a white Democrat and a white Republican, for
example, if the Republican candidate is highly undesirable to black voters, his
Democratic opponent could easily take black support for granted.96
The perverse effects theory's underlying logic reveals it to be critically
dependent upon two empirical factors: (1) the political distance between
voters, or whether nonminority voters are considerably more conservative than
minority voters, and (2) the political distance between candidates, which
affects the responsiveness of nonminority legislators to their minority
constituents. Since the perverse effects theory is an empirical proposition -not
a logical certainty-a review of the literature on the subject can reveal the
validity of its application to minority communities.
This literature is split on the validity of the perverse effects theory in the
African-American context. While there are several studies suggesting that
African-Americans have lost substantive representation as a result of their
concentration in majority-minority districts, 97 there is a growing body of
evidence suggesting that the descriptive gains precipitated by majority-black
districts do not lead to subsequent losses in substantive representation, and
that in fact the best means to maximize black substantive representation is to
maximize the number of black elected officials. 98
There is less ambiguity in the Latino context. While no study has yet put
forward affirmative evidence that the perverse effects theory holds true for
Latinos, Delia Grigg and Jonathan Katz have concluded that gains in
descriptive representation do not come at the expense of losses in substantive
95. LUBLIN, supra note 7, at 91-96; Lublin, supra note 21, at 185.
96. Karlan, supra note IS, at 32.
97. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
98. See Grigg & Katz, supra note 45, at 9, 13 (finding that the perverse effects hypothesis was not
supported by data from the 1972-20oo House of Representatives elections); Christian R.
Grose, Black-Majority Districts or Black Influence Districts?: Evaluating the Effect of
Descriptive Representation on the Substantive Representation of African-Americans in
Black-Majority and Black Influence Districts in the Wake of Georgia v. Ashcroft 28-29 (Feb.
9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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representation, 9 specifically finding that the presence of majority-Hispanic
(and majority-black) districts in a redistricting plan does not create a pro-
Republican bias in the overall area undergoing redistricting. 10
Although this lack of affirmative evidence is not dispositive, there are
independent reasons to believe that majority-Latino districts are not harmful to
Latino substantive representation. The Hispanic electorate is generally less
politically cohesive- specifically, less uniformly Democratic-than the black
electorate. This means that the placement of Hispanic voters in majority-
Hispanic districts- and hence their separation from neighboring non-Hispanic
voters-will have a less polarizing effect on subsequent elections in
surrounding districts.'0 1 For example, if there are one hundred minority voters
in a hypothetical thousand-person district, the removal of those voters from
that district will cause less of a rightward swing if those hundred minority
voters vote merely 55% Democratic (as Latinos roughly do), and not 8o%
Democratic (the approximate rate for African-Americans). On the other hand,
if Hispanics are more moderate than African-Americans, Hispanics in an
influence district may stand a greater chance of being critical swing voters; it is
less likely that they will be so dissatisfied with a Republican candidate that they
will automatically vote for a Democrat.
More research is needed to determine the harms and benefits of Latino
influence districts. At this point, however, given that there is no guarantee that
Latino influence districts will create a coveted class of Latino swing voters, and
no evidence that such districts will avoid any substantive harms brought by
majority-Latino districts, it is hard to identify any increase in voting strength
brought about by Latino influence districts. Therefore, there is little
justification for using Latino influence districts in lieu of Latino-majority
districts.
99. Grigg & Katz, supra note 45, at 13.
oo. Id. at 2. Notably, the study that has most closely examined the parallel districting
experiences of both African-Americans and Latinos - The Paradox of Representation by David
Lublin- concludes that the perverse effects theory holds for African-Americans (at least in
the South), but remains silent on the topic for Latinos. LUBLIN, supra note 7, at 91-96.
loi. This hypothesis is strengthened when one considers that Hispanics in covered jurisdictions
are slightly more likely to live in so-called blue states than African-Americans. This means
that the political distance between Hispanics and their non-Hispanic neighbors will, on
average, be smaller than that for African-Americans. Just under 17/o of Hispanics living in
covered jurisdictions live in California, Michigan, New Hampshire, and New York-states
that went to Senator John Kerry in 2004-compared to 12.5% of African-Americans. See
supra tbl. 1; Michael Gastner et al., Maps and Cartograms of the 2004 US Presidential
Election Results, http://www-personal.umich.edu/-mejn/election (last visited Apr. 6,
20o6).
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3. The Continuing Need for Hispanic-Majority Districts
In contrast to the unsubstantiated benefits of Hispanic coalitional and
influence districts, Hispanic-majority districts are critical to Latino voting
strength. Hispanic candidates are rarely elected outside of Latino-majority
districts, ' °2 and they enjoy a high rate of success within them."0 3 The
demographic characteristics of the Hispanic population do more than
necessitate the use of majority-minority districts, however. High rates of
ineligibility and low participation rates require that the majority-Hispanic
districts constructed be more than simply 50% Hispanic. 1 4 Some scholars have
placed the average population threshold necessary for Hispanics to have the
ability to elect their candidate of choice between 55% and 6o% Latino. 1 5
102. My tabulations of 2ooo census figures show that only 20% of the current Hispanic members
of the House of Representatives hail from districts that are less than half Hispanic in total
population. Similar proportions exist in state legislatures. See David Lublin, Percent of
Hispanic Legislators Elected in Hispanic-Majority, Black + Hispanic-Majority, and Other
Districts, http://www.american.edu/dlublin/redistricting/tab7.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2006) (showing that approximately 80% of Hispanic state legislators are elected from
majority-Hispanic districts). Note that figures are up to date for the last election held in
each seat prior to 2006. Id. This is not a recent development; the vast majority of Hispanics
elected to Congress in the twentieth century were elected from majority-minority
congressional districts. Walter C. Farrell, Jr. & James H. Johnson, Jr., Minority Political
Participation in the New Millennium: The New Demographics and the Voting Rights Act, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1215, 1231 (2001).
103. David Lublin's historical analysis found that Latinos won 82 of the 1o5 elections held in
Latino-majority districts. See LUBLIN, supra note 7, at 48.
104. My tabulations of 2000 census data show that over two-thirds of the current Hispanic
members of the House of Representatives come from districts where Latinos make up over
6o% of the total population.
ioS. See Brischetto, supra note 78, at 49 ("[T]he threshold for likely success of Latinos is 58
percent Latino."); Kim Geron & James S. Lai, Beyond Symbolic Representation: A Comparison
of the Electoral Pathways and Policy Priorities of Asian American and Latino Elected Officials, 9
ASIAN L.J. 41, 78 (2002) (reporting that Latino elected officials surveyed had an average of
56% Latino population in their districts). Geron and Lai concluded that the "concentration
of Latinos into relatively compact electoral districts remains the primary means that Latinos
will be elected to office." Geron & Lai, supra, at 78.
Some earlier studies estimated the necessary population threshold to be even higher.
James Loewen, for example, used data from 198os city and national races in New York City
to calculate that in three white-Latino boroughs Latinos would need to constitute between
66% and 79% (or a "super-majority") of a district's population in order for there to be a
"tossup" between another candidate and their candidate of choice. James W. Loewen, Levels
of Political Mobilization and Racial Bloc Voting Among Latinos, Anglos, and African Americans in
New York City, 13 CHIc. o-LAT1No L. REV. 38, 67-70 (1993). In 1988, Kimball Brace warned
that because of high noncitizenship rates, Hispanics might need to constitute "well above
65%" of a district's population in order to serve as an effective majority in the district.
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Like Hispanics, African-Americans depend on majority-black districts to
elect their candidates of choice."' 6 Due to Hispanics' eligibility and
participation rates, however, Hispanics need stronger majority-minority
districts than African-Americans. °7 Bruce Cain and Kenneth Miller explain this
phenomenon:
[W]hereas the African-American population is often at a disadvantage
with respect to the ratio of voters to population when it is grouped
together with Anglo voters, it is often advantaged as compared to
Latinos (who in addition to sharing similar problems in terms of levels
of education and socioeconomic disadvantage suffer the burdens of
noncitizenship and higher levels of age ineligibility).'o8
This disadvantage is such that the average Hispanic-majority district is less
likely to elect a Hispanic than a black-majority district a black candidate." 9
Justice O'Connor made a mistake when she ignored powerful evidence
showing that African-American voters still need majority-minority districts to
elect their candidates of choice. Her most grievous error, however, was
Kimball Brace et al., Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice, 1o
LAw&POL'Y 43, 61 n.8 (1988).
One study that deviated from this earlier trend was conducted by Bernard Grofman and
Lisa Handley, who found that Latinos only needed a clear plurality to have a realistic
opportunity to elect their candidate to Congress, but only if the district had a combined
minority population of 55%. They also admitted that Hispanics "generally are not elected" in
cities with less than a 64% combined minority population. Grofman and Handley, supra
note 85, at 37-38.
1o6. David Lublin found that while African-Americans consistently lost in black coalitional
districts, they consistently succeeded in majority-black districts. See LUBLIN, supra note 7, at
41; see also Handley et al., supra note 8, at 37 ("[W]e have found no evidence to indicate that
majority minority districts are no longer necessary to ensure African-Americans and
Hispanics fair representation in our legislative bodies."); Benson, supra note 16, at 494;
Grigg & Katz, supra note 45, at 13 ("The evidence shows that the presence of [majority-
minority districts] in a state substantially increases the election of [black and Latino]
members to Congress.").
107. See Brischetto, supra note 78, at 50 ("Compared to African Americans, Latinos usually must
comprise a greater proportion of the population if the district is to be 'safe.'").
lo8. See Cain & Miller, supra note 80, at 146.
log. See Handley et al., supra note 8, at 25-26; see also LUBLIN, supra note 7, at 54 (showing that
black-majority districts are slightly more effective than Latino-majority districts in electing a
minority representative). Lublin further explained that Hispanic-majority districts are even
less effective when the proportion of long-term residents in the district drops to or below
80%. Id. at 51. Likewise, Hispanic coalitional districts are, on average, slightly less effective
than black coalitional districts. Compare LUBLIN, supra note 7, at 48 (finding that Latinos
only won 29 out of 5190 congressional races held outside of majority-Latino districts), with
id. at 41 (finding that African-Americans won 72 out of 5079 races held outside of majority-
black districts).
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ignoring an entire body of literature that uniformly established that Hispanics
are poorly served by coalitional and influence districts, and that they continue
to rely on robust majority-minority districts -even more so than their black
counterparts.'°
C. The Threat of Georgia v. Ashcroft to the Hispanic Community
The evidence above reveals the markedly detrimental impact that Georgia v.
Ashcroft will have on the Hispanic community. While Hispanics are acutely
vio. The few studies that question the benefits or necessity of majority-Hispanic districts are
either outdated or based on a relatively narrow field of statistical evidence. Rodolfo de la
Garza and Louis DeSipio argued that the creation of majority-minority districts through the
VRA has lowered turnout and hence "reduced electoral competition in high-concentration
Latino areas." See de la Garza & DeSipio, Save the Baby, supra note 69, at 102. They
recommended the creation of influence districts to "assure that there is active competition
for Latino votes and mobilization of new voters." Id. at ii6.
First, de la Garza and DeSipio themselves admitted that majority-minority districting
could be a minor cause of low turnout when compared to the depressive effects of other
socioeconomic factors. Id. at 113. Second, the authors only cited a single study to support
their central contention that majority-minority districts do, in fact, lower turnout; the study
in question analyzed elections in only five cities. Id. at 112, 122 n.12. Finally, these findings
are contradicted by at least three studies suggesting that majority-minority districts in fact
work to boost Latino turnout. See Matt A. Barreto et al., The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-
Minority Districts on Latino Turnout, 98 AM. POL. SC. REv. 65, 74 (2004) ("Latinos vote more
when in a majority-Latino district, contrary to the expectations of those who expected or
feared minority demobilization."); Loewen, supra note 1o5, at 67 ("[D] rawing districts with
higher proportions of Latino voters may prompt political mobilization."); Gary M. Segura &
Nathan D. Woods, Majority-Minority Districts, Co-Ethnic Candidates, and Mobilization
Effects 11-12 (Feb. 9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding that the
concentration of Hispanic voters in electoral districts has a uniformly mobilizing effect in
California, and a net positive effect in New York, once the Hispanic percentage of a district
reaches 40% to 55%); see also Benson, supra note 16, at 498 ("[M]inority voter turnout
decreases when the concentration of minority voters in a district falls below a certain point.").
Leo Estrada made the distinct argument that majority-minority districts are, in fact,
unnecessary for Latinos' electoral success. First, he claimed that "Latinos .. . have
demonstrated their ability to win elections in non-Latino districts more so than other ethnic
groups." Estrada, supra note 82, at 1289. Second, he argued in favor of influence districts,
stating that "Latinos ... are capable of winning strong influence districts without having
majority CVAP districts." Id. at 1293. Again, however, Estrada's information is questionable
and limited in its applicability. He cited no comprehensive econometric studies; rather, he
supported both claims with purely anecdotal evidence-for example, lists of successful
Latino candidates from non-Latino districts-that appears to be entirely drawn from
California. See id. at 1289 n.30. Indeed, while there has been limited anecdotal evidence that
Latinos in California enjoy substantial crossover support, these findings must be weighed
against contradictory econometric evidence. In any event, California is regarded by some
experts to be an exception to the rule in the redistricting context. See supra note 85.
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dependent on Hispanic-majority districts, Georgia v. Ashcroft allows those
districts to be unpacked in favor of coalitional or influence districts that do
little to build Hispanic voting strength, however it is defined. This process has
already begun in Texas, where the Department of Justice precleared" ' a 2003
congressional redistricting plan that its own analysts determined would not
"maintain districts where Hispanic voters previously elected their candidates of
choice."" 2 Specifically, they found that the proposed plan reduced by one the
number of districts where Hispanics could safely elect their candidates of
choice, and only added a Hispanic coalitional district to make up the
difference." 3
There is one final consideration that makes Georgia v. Ashcroft particularly
damning for Hispanics: Majority-Hispanic districts are more difficult to create
than majority-black districts. Even though Hispanics are more reliant on
majority-minority districts than African-Americans, Hispanics' geographic
dispersion and the recent nature of their population growth have made
drawing (and maintaining) majority-Hispanic districts relatively more
difficult. To begin with, Hispanics' geographic dispersion makes it difficult for
Hispanics to successfully bring a section 2 vote dilution suit, which might
prompt the creation of a majority-Hispanic district. Since Thornburg v.
Gingles"14 - a foundational section 2 case -the Supreme Court has required vote
dilution plaintiffs to prove that the minority group in question is sufficiently
compact to form a single-member district. This compactness requirement is
more difficult for Hispanics to meet, given that they are more residentially
dispersed than African-Americans."'5 One group of scholars cited the relative
dispersion of Hispanics to explain the fact that fewer majority-Hispanic
districts were created relative to population than majority-black districts during
the post-199o redistricting process.6
iii. Dan Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal: Voting Rights Finding on Map Pushed
by DeLay Was Overruled, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at Al (documenting that senior Justice
Department officials approved the districting plan).
112. Mellett et al., supra note 16, at 68.
113. Id.
114. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
115. Id. at So.
116. Handley et al., supra note 8, at 2S; see also Brischetto, supra note 78, at 55 (citing residential
isolation as one factor making "effective districts" for Latinos particularly difficult to create);
Geron & Lai, supra note 105, at 46 (confirming that districts favorable to Hispanics are more
difficult to draw due to greater residential dispersion).
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Hispanics' geographic dispersion also makes it more difficult for majority-
Hispanic districts to survive legal challenges. In 1993, Shaw v. Reno117
established that districts that appeared to rely overwhelmingly on race could be
deemed invalid under the Equal Protection clause."' This is particularly
threatening for Hispanics, who, because of their relative residential dispersion,
often cannot be joined into one district without creatively shaped district
boundaries. Hence, a widely dispersed Hispanic community seeking to create a
majority-Hispanic district faces the double burden of being unable to demand
the construction of a majority-Hispanic district due to Gingles, and, conversely,
having their district deemed invalid under Shaw." 9
Hispanics' recent population growth has only added to these difficulties.
Because the Latino population boom has only taken shape in the last several
decades, 2 ' there have been few districting cycles in which Hispanic-majority
districts could have been drawn. Bernard Grofman extrapolates from this
factor to conclude that Hispanics will be the group most harmed by the legacy
of Georgia v. Ashcroft:
In Congress, and in state legislatures, most of the black majority (or
near majority) districts that could have been created are already in
place, and blacks are a declining portion of the total electorate (except
in a handful of states) so we should not expect to see new black
majority seats created. For Hispanics (the fastest growing minority in
the U.S.) in covered jurisdictions, such as Texas, that is not true. A
legal climate that discourages the creation of new majority-minority
districts will have its greatest impact on Hispanic representation. 2'
Perversely, then, Georgia v. Ashcroft creates all the wrong incentives. Hispanics
face exceptional difficulties in establishing and maintaining majority-Hispanic
districts. Nevertheless, Georgia v. Ashcroft will facilitate the elimination of those
precious few majority-Hispanic districts that have already been created-in
spite of the fact that today, the evidence suggests that Hispanics may need
them the most.
117. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
118. Id. at 649.
ing. Cain & Miller, supra note 8o, at 161 ("Since Latino and Asian communities are usually less
compact than those of African Americans, these groups will face an even harder task creating
districts that meet the first Gingles precondition while still complying with Shaw.").
120. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
121. Grofman, supra note 24, at 12 n.13.
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III. REPAIRING THE DAMAGE OF GEORGIA V. ASHCROFT
The Supreme Court's opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft is written in a way that
invites the erosion of electoral gains in Latino communities covered by section
5. In broadening the ability to elect standard and subsuming that standard
within a totality of the circumstances test, Justice O'Connor markedly
deemphasized the role of racially polarized voting in the section 5 preclearance
calculus. 22 It is easy to envision the Department of Justice or the courts
preclearing redistricting plans that unpack majority-Latino districts in favor of
Latino coalitional districts without recognizing that "coalitions" are not actually
possible.
This Part discusses two strategies - one for Congress, one for courts - to
prevent the unwarranted elimination of majority-minority districts that may be
occasioned by Georgia v. Ashcroft. The first strategy centers around the
reauthorization of section 5 of the VRA, which is currently due to expire in
2007. The second strategy is to advance a novel legal argument should the first
strategy-currently pursued by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and other civil
rights groups - not succeed.
A. The Georgia v. Ashcroft Legislative "Fix"
In 2005, hearings began in the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives to discuss the reauthorization of section 5 and several other
VRA provisions set to expire in 2007. Voting rights advocates hope to convince
legislators to amend section 5 during the reauthorization process to undo the
changes of Georgia v. Ashcroft; this legislative fix would add language to section
5 that would make ability to elect the cornerstone of section 5 preclearance
analysis. This would not result in a return to the pre-Georgia v. Ashcroft
standard; rather, this would make ability to elect the first among equals of the
factors of the totality of the circumstances test.
Such an amendment would prohibit the unpacking of majority-minority
districts in the absence of a specific set of circumstances. Professor Jocelyn
Benson has proposed a ban on reductions below 55% of covered minority
populations in any currently majority-minority district, unless the jurisdiction
122. In fact, racially polarized voting makes a single appearance in Justice O'Connor's opinion, in
a sentence in which she states that "evidence of racial polarization is one of many factors
relevant in assessing whether a minority group is able to elect a candidate of choice or to
exert a significant influence in a particular district." Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 485
(2003); see Karlan, supra note 15, at 34 (noting Georgia's one-sentence treatment of racially
polarized voting).
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can present convincing evidence that racially polarized voting is nonexistent or
that minority voters' participation rates will remain unaffected. 23 A more
tempered approach would avoid a specific numerical cutoff, and would allow
the unpacking of majority-minority districts only upon a showing of
historically consistent levels of crossover support sufficient to enable the
minority community in question to enjoy the same ability to elect as it had
experienced before.
Neither formulation would allow for the substitution of influence districts
for majority-minority districts: By definition, the substitution of influence
districts for majority-minority districts diminishes a minority group's "ability
to elect." These strategies would, however, allow for the substitution of
coalitional districts for majority-minority districts -but only upon a showing
that the coalitional district would have enough crossover voters to actually
work.
There are two reasons to think that a legislative fix could actually work.
First of all, such a strategy has succeeded before: During the 1982
reauthorization of the VRA, advocates successfully lobbied for the amendment
of section 2 to prohibit all voting changes with a discriminatory effect,
overturning the holding in Mobile v. Bolden, a case that held that only those
changes with discriminatory intent would be prohibited."
Second, a flexible section 5 standard that allows for the unpacking of
majority-minority districts only upon the satisfaction of a specific set of
conditions actually appears to be what Richard Pildes-one of Justice
O'Connor's cited authorities and arguably the most vehement critic of section
5-originally envisioned. Professor Pildes called for the adoption of a
"functional approach" to section 5 under which "there is no impermissible
'retrogression' under section 5 of the VRA if a jurisdiction recasts a safe district
of the 199os into a coalitional district in the 200os, as long as the evidence
shows that the coalitional district will afford an equal opportunity to elect." 2s
In fact, Professor Pildes has recognized that in redistricting cases, the level of
racially polarized voting in a jurisdiction is "[tihe critical legal question" that
courts must consider." 6 The benefit of a flexible but reformed section 5
standard is that it would both recognize that coalitional districts are sometimes
effective -accepting the mantra of various conservative voting rights
123. Benson, supra note 16, at 509.
124. 446 U.S. 55, 62, 74 (198o); see Benson, supra note 16, at 501-505 (explaining how the holding
in Mobile was successfully neutralized during the 1982 reauthorization process).
125. Pildes, supra note 20, at 1568.
126. Id. at 1518.
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scholars' 27-and simultaneously prevent the substitution of such districts for
majority-minority districts where this would have a negative net impact on the
minority group's ability to elect.
B. Reinvigorating the Totality of the Circumstances Test
In the event that voting rights advocates are unable to convince Congress to
amend section 5 during the reauthorization process, these advocates could
pursue a litigation strategy to persuade the Court to achieve the same result-
the restoration of ability to elect as the cornerstone of section 5 analysis.
Specifically, litigants should seize upon Justice O'Connor use of the totality
of circumstances test employed in section 2 vote dilution suits in the section 5
context.128 This move was critical to the holding in Georgia v. Ashcroft: Only by
adopting this broad test was O'Connor able to argue that the section 5
preclearance inquiry should not be limited to an evaluation of a plan's effect on
a minority group's ability to elect, but that it should also include a
consideration of the plan's impact on a minority group's "opportunity to
participate in the political process" 29-no previous section 5 case allowed
opportunity to participate to enter the preclearance calculus. What Justice
O'Connor did not consider, however, is that there is a body of precedent that
informs when and how coalitional districts can be weighed in the section 2-
and arguably now in the section 5-calculus.
In section 2 vote dilution suits, plaintiffs seek to establish that their overall
electoral effectiveness has been diminished by the law, regulation, or activity in
question. In the redistricting context, the few courts that have been asked to do
so have generally considered the presence of coalitional districts to weigh
against a finding of vote dilution. This has not been automatic, however:
Rather, courts typically have only found coalitional districts unproblematic
upon a showing that these districts would serve their stated purpose-the
127. See, e.g., Kousser, supra note 82, at 565 (arguing that the effectiveness of a district does not
depend on the existence of a numerical majority of minority voters within it).
128. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 484-85 (2003) ("As Justice Souter recognized for the
Court in the § 2 context, a court or the Department of Justice should assess the totality of
circumstances in determining retrogression under § 5." (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1020-21 (1994))).
129. See id. at 485. Note that Johnson is a section 2 vote dilution case and not a section 5
preclearance case. Id.
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formation of biracial or multiracial coalitions. Three cases illustrate this
dominant trend.130
Representatives of minority voters in section 5 covered jurisdictions should
cite these precedents and demand, in the words of one district court judge, that
"before the existence of [a coalitional] district is given significant weight in the
balance, the evidence must reveal that minority voters in the district have in
fact joined with other voters to elect representatives of their choice. '131 Thus,
such unpacking should occur only if minority groups maintain their ability to
elect candidates of their choice. Under these same precedents, advocates could
categorically oppose the unpacking of majority-minority districts in favor of
influence districts, given that this would necessarily result in a diminution of
ability to elect.
This strategy is promising, but by no means guaranteed. In spite of her
adoption of the section 2 totality of the circumstances standard in the section 5
context,132 Justice O'Connor inexplicably emphasized that section 2 and section
5 "combat different evils and, accordingly ... impose very different duties
upon the States."133 More troubling, however, is that in the section 2 vote
dilution cases, even courts requiring evidence of crossover voting inevitably
130. See Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 991 n.13 (1st Cir. 1995) (cautioning that for an
influence district to weigh against a finding of vote dilution under section 2, evidence of
crossover voting must be presented). Note that Judge Selya used the term "influence
district" to refer to coalitional districts. Id.; see also Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175, 197 (3d Cir.
2001) (remanding a section 2 vote dilution case with the warning that "[e]vidence
establishing the factual existence of [crossover] voting behavior will be absolutely vital");
Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1323-24 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (eschewing distinctions
between majority-minority, coalitional, and influence districts in favor of the simple
question of whether a district would actually result in the election of a minority candidate).
But see Rural W. Tenn. Afr.-Am. Affairs Council, Inc. v. McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1o96,
1104 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (using a standard rule that any district with 25%-55% minority
population would be considered a coalitional district for the purposes of the vote dilution
analysis, regardless of the level of racially polarized voting in the district in question.). Note
that the court in McWherter did not distinguish between influence districts and coalitional
districts, using the former term to refer to both. Nevertheless, the language of the opinion,
particularly its discussion of"the actual ability of minority voters to build coalitions within a
district," strongly suggests that these passages addressed coalitional districts. Id. at 1104.
131. Uno, 72 F.3d at 991 n.13. As clarified above, Judge Selya of the First Circuit mistakenly used
the term "influence" district to refer to a coalitional district. This is evidenced by his referral
to the formation of coalitions between minority and other voters. See supra note 130.
132. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
133. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 478 (citing Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 477 (1997)).
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found that such crossover support was present. M This suggests that the
crossover voting requirement was not sufficiently rigorous.
The fact remains, however, that Georgia v. Ashcroft is a crucial precedent on
surprisingly tenuous footing, having lost two members of its 5-4 majority-
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor herself-within one year. In the
201o redistricting cycle, assuming Congress has reauthorized section 5 without
implementing a legislative fix, the Roberts Court will undoubtedly reexamine
the reasoning in Georgia v. Ashcroft. In this precarious situation, a line of
precedents preventing the elimination of majority-minority districts in the
absence of evidence of crossover voting could provide valuable guidance in
reevaluating a radical new judicial standard.
CONCLUSION
Professor Pildes pointed out that "[f]aw and social science are perhaps
nowhere more mutually dependent than in the voting-rights field" 3s and that
the validity of much of voting rights law depends on a "decade-by-decade
updating of the law's application based on the most current social-scientific
findings." 36 Today, more than forty years after the enactment of the VRA, the
nature of that updating must itself be updated. The demographics and voting
patterns of Latinos are sufficiently different from those of African-Americans
that courts considering section 5 cases -and indeed, much of voting rights laws
and precedents -should be wary of assuming that the possible attributes of one
group extend to another.
Evidence from "minority communities," "minority groups," or "minorities"
should not be presented as such unless the data cited is indeed drawn from all
of the minority groups affected by the measure at hand. Furthermore, courts
should account for the relevant differences between minority groups in
drafting their opinions by leaving in place the factual triggers-for example,
rates of ineligibility and levels of crossover support-that are necessary to
134. Uno, 72 F. 3d at 991 (finding that the presence of a 28% Hispanic district in an aldermanic
districting plan should be considered in the district court's vote dilution inquiry); Martinez,
234 F. Supp. 2d at 1323-24 (finding that the minority-black districts in question would likely
"perform for black voters" and hence not finding vote dilution); Barrels, 144 F. Supp. 2d at
364-66 (finding that reliable crossover voting existed such that the districting plan that
unpacked a majority African-American district into a 270% African-American coalitional
district would actually "enhance and expand" opportunities for blacks and Hispanics to
participate in the political process).
135. Pildes, supra note 20, at 1518.
136. Id. at 1519.
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differentiate between the electoral experiences of different minority
communities.
Such caution is entirely absent from Georgia v. Ashcroft. Instead, the
decision highlights information derived entirely from a certain group of
African-American communities -selective and controversial data in its own
right-and uses it to justify a radical change in section 5 that will apply to
African-Americans and Hispanics alike. This Note has shown this conflation to
be unjustified. There is no evidence that coalitional or influence districts will
bolster the voting strength of most Hispanic communities; instead, robust
majority-minority districts remain the primary avenue to electoral success for
the Hispanic communities' candidates of choice. While there is also strong
evidence that African-Americans continue to rely on majority-minority
districts -evidence that was itself unjustifiably sidestepped by Justice
O'Connor- this pattern is almost undeniable in the Hispanic community.
It is too late to ask what would have happened if Justice O'Connor had
examined studies pertaining to Hispanics as well as African-Americans, or if
she had considered all of the evidence available from the African-American
community. It is not too late, however, for voting rights advocates to take
action to correct the Court's mistakes-for the benefit of Hispanics and other
minority groups alike. The reauthorization process provides an ideal
opportunity to right the wrongs of Georgia v. Ashcroft; if that effort fails,
however, voting rights advocates can still make strong legal arguments to
prevent the dissolution of majority-minority districts in those minority
communities that may now need them the most.
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